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The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is a product of its self-interest. Striving 
to protect Iran’s Islamic theocracy from external threats drives the country’s 
approach to foreign affairs. That approach can, at times, look aggressive or 
pragmatic. A sectarian angle also exists. Given its relative alienation from its 
neighbors since the 1979 revolution, Iran has relied on a strategy of form-
ing relationships with nonstate groups to help promote its strategic interests. 
Although it supports Sunni groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and 
Hamas, Iran’s backing of Shia organizations has most angered its neighbors. 
That practice, often fused with the unofficial policy of exporting the revolu-
tion, has paid dividends for Iran strategically but has also hardened perceptions 
of its confessional bias. 
Religion and Iranian Behavior in the Middle East
• Religion has been an inseparable component of Iranian decisionmaking 
since the 1979 revolution. 
• Since the revolution, Iran’s leaders have stressed their commitment to 
Islamic unity. They downplay the Shia character of the Islamic Republic 
when speaking on foreign policy issues and continue to express the pan-
Islamic, as opposed to Shia-centric, tenets of the revolution’s founder, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
• Despite its pan-Islamic aspirations, since 2003, Iran’s strategic approach in 
the Middle East has focused on supporting Shia armed groups. Working 
through those nonstate clients has helped Iran greatly expand its regional 
influence, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. 
Conclusions 
• Religious identity and beliefs influence Iran’s approach to foreign relation-
ships, but they do not dictate them. Religion matters little in Iran’s state-to-
state relationships, but it figures more prominently in Iran’s relations with 
nonstate groups.
• Essentializing Iran’s foreign policy as sectarian obscures more than it reveals 
about its behavior. However, as the Middle East has grown more sectarian 
since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring, so too has Iran’s 
regional behavior. 
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• Iran’s operations in Syria provide the most overt examples of its sectarian 
behavior. Iran has facilitated the involvement of thousands of non-Syrian 
Shia militants to help defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Even though 
Iranian leaders stress the legitimacy of the intervention in Syria, and deny 
any sectarian agenda, Iran’s military and its affiliates frame their role in that 
war in distinctly confessional terms.
• Iran’s regional activities cannot be divorced from the explosion of Sunni 
sectarianism across the Middle East. Iran accuses its Sunni neighbors of 
supporting the rise of Sunni extremism and feels compelled to counter that 
behavior by doubling down on support to Shia allies of its own.
3Introduction
With wars raging in the Middle East, more attention is being paid to Iran’s 
regional role. The Islamic Republic is actively supporting its allies in the region’s 
main conflicts—Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—which has put it on the opposite side 
of most of its neighbors. That divide is more than political or strategic: it is sec-
tarian. Iran and its main allies are all Shia or considered as such. Together they 
are fighting against Sunni forces backed by Sunni-led states. This dynamic has 
deepened the region’s descent into sectarianism and has exacerbated political 
disputes between Iran and many of its Sunni neighbors. 
Iran’s critics, especially Saudi Arabia, view its foreign policies as sectarian 
and expansionist. They argue that Iran has been exploiting political unrest 
across the region to champion its militant Shia clients and undermine the 
Sunni-dominated status quo. They see Iran’s endgame as an expansive, trans-
national, pro-Iranian Shia polity stretching from Iran to Lebanon and encom-
passing Iraq and Syria—something akin to a resurrected Persian empire, but 
with the Shia faith and allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader as the unifying 
characteristics. Such a scenario is worrisome to Iran’s neighbors and something 
Saudi Arabia and others appear committed to preventing.1 
The Islamic Republic’s foreign policies are aimed at 
advancing its strategic interests. Sectarianism plays a role 
in those policies, but not in the single-minded, all-encom-
passing way that Iran’s critics suggest. Indeed, for most 
of its history, the Islamic Republic has followed a largely 
nonsectarian path. Iran’s leaders have long emphasized pan-Islamic ideals and 
courted Sunni allies. The majority of scholars who have studied Iranian foreign 
policy since 1979 do not describe that record of behavior as sectarian, meaning 
primarily aimed at advancing a pro-Shia agenda. Rather, they see Iran’s deci-
sionmaking as closer to realpolitik.2 
However, the sectarian element in Iranian foreign policy has increased over 
the last decade. The primary catalysts for the country’s shift toward a more 
clear-cut favoring of Shia clients and allies in the Middle East were the toppling 
of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the Arab Spring beginning 
in late 2010. Those events and the conflicts they ignited— particularly in Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen—have sharply divided the interests of Iran and its neighbors. 
Fearful of each other’s intentions, the behavior of Iran and its Arab rivals has 
moved increasingly in a sectarian direction. Such sectarianism runs counter to 
Tehran’s official positions, but close relationships with Shia allies have become 
The Islamic Republic’s foreign policies are 
aimed at advancing its strategic interests. 
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the basis of Iranian influence in the region. With its allies threatened in Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen, Iran has doubled down on its pro-Shia strategy as a way 
of protecting its regional interests and investments. This has been exempli-
fied in the behavior and rhetoric of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC)—Iran’s preeminent military organization and the leading agency in 
its strategic activities in the Middle East. In addition to being heavily involved 
in the region’s conflicts, the IRGC has begun to portray its allies and clients as 
a unified Shia front with regional ambitions. 
Iran’s Reputation and 
Competing Visions of Sectarianism
In 2016, as part of their bitter feud, Iran and Saudi Arabia exchanged public 
accusations of sectarianism that reached as far as mainstream media outlets 
in the United States. In September, the New York Times published an op-ed 
by Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled “Let Us Rid the 
World of Wahhabism.”3 Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a 
plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East 
and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a “theological perversion” that 
has “wrought havoc” and had a “devastating” impact in Islamic communi-
ties. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct 
result of “Riyadh’s persistent sponsorship of extremism,” he argues, and this 
violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses 
Saudi Arabia of “playing the ‘Iran card’” to induce its allies to take part in 
the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that “concrete action against 
extremism is needed.” Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif “invite[s]” 
Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the 
accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran’s neighbor and 
archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war. 
However, Zarif also speaks to Iran’s view of sectarianism and sectarian con-
flict in the Middle East. They are not organic, but rather the by-products of a 
misguided effort by Saudi Arabia and its Western allies to isolate Iran and curb 
its influence. Has Iran contributed, in any way, to the region’s current sectarian 
morass? Not according to Zarif. The blame is entirely one-sided. 
The September 2016 op-ed followed another that the Iranian foreign min-
ister wrote months earlier in January. In that piece, entitled “Saudi Arabia’s 
Reckless Extremism,” the veteran diplomat argues that while Iran’s president, 
Hassan Rouhani, has made “friendship with our neighbors, peace and stability 
in the region and global cooperation” priorities for Iran, as evinced by the July 
2015 nuclear deal, “some countries,” particularly Saudi Arabia, have stood in 
the way of Iran’s efforts at “constructive engagement.”4 
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Zarif thus begins a similar broadside against the Saudi regime. He lists sev-
eral reasons why Saudi Arabia is harming regional security. Riyadh is not only 
obstructing Iran’s efforts at compromise and friendship but also is involved in 
the “active sponsorship of violent extremism.” Zarif links Saudi Arabia to ter-
rorist attacks in the West, al-Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East, and extrem-
ism around the globe. Zarif frames the Saudi war in Yemen, Saudi support 
for Syria’s Islamist rebels, and other acts as ways to bait Iran and “derail the 
nuclear agreement” by exacerbating tensions in the region.5 
The January op-ed appeared at a flashpoint in Iranian-Saudi relations. 
Eight days earlier, the Saudi government had executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a 
senior Saudi Shia cleric and political activist, along with forty-six other prison-
ers (mostly Sunni radicals). The incident caused ire in Iran and elsewhere, with 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warning that the Saudi monarchy would suffer 
“divine revenge.”6 Iraqi Shia militias allied with Iran also promised vengeance.7 
Fury over the execution of al-Nimr culminated in a large protest outside of the 
Saudi embassy in Tehran. During the demonstration, a group of hardliners 
stormed the embassy and set it on fire. 
The fallout for Iran was quick. Saudi Arabia and all of its Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) allies (except Oman), plus Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan sev-
ered or downgraded diplomatic ties with Iran. The incident was an embarrass-
ment for Iran. The government scrambled to stem the blowback by claiming 
the attack had been the action of rogue elements and arresting some of the 
individuals involved. Zarif ’s open letter fell into that context, but instead of an 
apology, it was an attempt to defend Iran by casting Saudi Arabia as the real 
culprit of regional unrest. 
Later that month, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Zarif ’s coun-
terpart, responded in kind through a New York Times op-ed of his own. 
The Saudi official responds to what he calls “outlandish” lies by reminding 
Zarif of Iran’s reputation:
We [Saudi Arabia] are not the country designated a state sponsor of terrorism; 
Iran is. We are not the nation under international sanctions for supporting ter-
rorism; Iran is. We are not the nation whose officials are on terrorism [watch] 
lists; Iran is.8 
Foreign Minister al-Jubeir further charges that, in condemning Saudi 
Arabia, Iran “opts to obscure its dangerous sectarian and expansionist poli-
cies,” rather than making the necessary effort to transform into a “respect-
able member of the international community.” For the Saudi foreign minister, 
Iran’s sectarian behavior has been “consistent since the 1979 revolution.” He 
points to Iran’s stated “objective of exporting the revolution” as the basis of 
its foreign policy ills, and he lists Iran’s support for Shia groups, “Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and sectarian militias in Iraq” as proof of 
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Iran’s continued sectarian agenda. This behavior runs counter to Iran’s stated 
desire for cooperation, al-Jubeir argues:
While Iran claims its top foreign policy priority is friendship, its behavior 
shows the opposite is true. Iran is the single-most-belligerent-actor in the 
region, and its actions display both a commitment to regional hegemony and 
a deeply held view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness either on Iran’s 
part or on the part of its adversaries.9 
Those comments should not be seen simply through the lens of Saudi-Iranian 
tensions. Rather, Middle Eastern officials widely share this perspective of Iran 
as a sectarian and expansionist actor in the region. In March 2015, Turkey’s 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Iran of “trying to dominate the 
region” through supporting Shia groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.10 In Iraq, he 
highlighted the involvement of the Quds Force, a division 
of Iran’s IRGC, as especially sectarian. Commenting on 
the Quds commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani, 
who oversees Iranian military operations abroad, Erdoğan 
claimed: “This is someone I know very well. . . . So, what 
is [Iran’s] objective? To increase the power of Shi’ite[s] in 
Iraq. That’s what they want.” A number of Arab states 
have made similar indictments regarding Iran’s activities outside its borders. 
Nearly the entire Arab League, which represents twenty-two states, formally 
condemned Iran’s foreign “meddling” at its annual 2016 meeting.11 Lebanon 
was the only league member not to sign the declaration.
The anxiety held by many Muslim states concerning Iran’s perceived sectar-
ian aspirations is mostly rooted in the rhetoric and behavior that Tehran’s lead-
ers adopted after the 1979 revolution—the ethno-nationalism of Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi and Iran’s history as a Shia state since the early modern 
Safavid dynasty are deeper sources of tension, but they are not the focus here. 
The revolution introduced a radical form of Shia Islamism and anti-monarchi-
cal views to Iranian politics. That ideological turn terrified the Persian Gulf ’s 
Arab monarchies and neighboring Iraq.12 With political activism rising in 
Iraq’s politically disenfranchised Shia-majority community, Saddam Hussein 
felt his country was especially vulnerable to Iran’s revolution. He claimed that 
Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, which set off the nearly eight-year Iran-Iraq 
war, was necessary to shield Iraq and the Sunni Arab world from the spread of 
the radical Shiism of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—the father of the revolu-
tion and Iran’s first supreme leader.13 The GCC, which was formed by the Arab 
sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf to create a unified front against Iran, backed 
Saddam Hussein in the war. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular bankrolled 
much of his war effort.14 
As problematic as he was, the Iraqi leader was considered by some to be a 
vital bulwark against Iran’s ambitions in the Middle East. He governed the 
Middle Eastern officials widely 
share this perspective of Iran as a 
sectarian and expansionist actor.
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most populous Shia country in the Arab world, which houses the most impor-
tant Shia centers of learning and pilgrimage. Through arrests, torture, and 
murder, Saddam Hussein ensured that Iran’s Shia revolutionary fervor would 
not take root in his country, or be embraced by Iraq’s prominent ayatollahs and 
potentially spread to Arab Shia communities elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. So 
when he was toppled in 2003, and Shia parties began to gain political power 
in Iraq, fears of expanding Iranian sectarian influence and regional ambitions 
skyrocketed in neighboring Gulf states.15 
Sensing Iran’s growing influence in the newly established Iraqi democracy, 
Jordan’s King Abdullah II warned in 2004 that by building a support base 
in Iraq, Iran was actually seeking to establish a massive Shia “crescent” that 
would spread from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.16 This geographic 
bloc of like-minded polities would challenge the status quo of pro-Western 
Sunni dominance in the Middle East. Abdullah’s caution was that if Iraq were 
to become dominated by pro-Iranian Shia parties, this could have a cascading 
effect in the region. Shia-Sunni tensions could reemerge, which could desta-
bilize Persian Gulf states that have sizable Shia minority populations, such as 
Saudi Arabia. This would “propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even 
more” outside of Iraq, Abdullah argued. 
From the perspectives of many Arab states and Turkey, if not that of the gen-
eral observer, recent history has borne out the sectarian conflict that Abdullah 
warned would occur. They see Shia-dominated, post-Baathist Iraq as the gen-
esis of what has become a series of sectarian-driven conflicts in Iraq, Syria, 
and Yemen, as well as in the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain and the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia. Iran is blamed for all of the turmoil. To its critics, 
these crises are a direct product of Iran’s unchecked ambitions to control the 
region through the sowing of sectarian discord and the establishment of pow-
erful Shia armed groups across the region.17 
Is Iran a Sectarian Actor? 
Iran’s activities in the Middle East are well-documented and can appear sectar-
ian in nature. There is no question that Iran is heavily involved in today’s con-
flicts in Iraq and Syria. The scope of Iranian activity in Yemen is murkier and 
more disputed,18 but Iran does little to hide its support to 
the Zaidi Shia Houthis and their Ansar Allah movement.19 
The fact that Iran’s allies in these conflicts are non-Sunnis 
who either share the same brand of Shiism as Iran’s leaders 
(Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias) or identify with 
other forms of Shia Islam (Alawism in Syria and Zaidism 
in Yemen) is also not in question. Such connections give Iran’s foreign policy a 
clear sectarian angle. But is Iran’s foreign policy driven by sectarian interests, 
or is it more complicated than that?
Iran’s activities in the Middle East are well-
documented and can appear sectarian in nature.
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When one analyzes Iran’s strategic behavior and decisionmaking, it is 
important to note that the country has two main levels of foreign policy, both 
of which are overseen by the supreme leader and subject to his authority, but 
which differ in content and form. The first level is state-to-state policy, which 
in most cases is managed by the elected government in Tehran. The second 
level is Iran’s relations with nonstate clients, which are overseen by the IRGC 
and mostly managed outside of the government’s purview.
Iran’s foreign policy can seem contradictory. As the country touts the 
supremacy of its Islamic system of government, and remains the world’s most 
vocal proponent of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, 
its relationships show a more diverse picture. Although 
Iran’s most ardent allies are nonstate actors, mostly Shia 
Islamist groups, Tehran maintains productive state-to-
state ties with a host of countries that espouse a number of 
non-Islamic systems. Iran is famously closer to India than 
its Muslim neighbor Pakistan, and Tehran has long favored largely Christian 
Armenia in its ongoing disputes with largely Shia Azerbaijan.20 Iran’s most 
ideologically committed civilian and military leaders have also had no dif-
ficulty developing important links with atheistic regimes, including those of 
China, North Korea, and Venezuela. 
Iran’s troubling and awkward relationship with al-Qaeda also indicates that 
there is more to Iranian foreign policy than sectarian goals. A smattering of al-
Qaeda operatives and their families have lived in Iran on and off since the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The first wave, including family members 
of Osama bin Laden, arrived in Iran having fled U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 
They were put in detention by Iranian authorities and held on ambiguous legal 
grounds. Internal al-Qaeda documents seized in the May 2011 Abbottabad 
raid that killed bin Laden speak of Iran as an enemy, not an ally, and of the 
group’s members in Iran as prisoners. Iran is also referred to with racial and 
anti-Shia sectarian epithets.21 After Iran’s release of some al-Qaeda members in 
2009, an internal memo written to bin Laden or his lieutenants suggests that 
the release might have been triggered by the organization’s operations against 
Iran, including the kidnapping of an Iranian “trade deputy in the consulate in 
Peshawar [a city in Pakistan].” The author of the letter further indicates that al-
Qaeda communications with Iran were virtually nil: “They [Iran] did not send 
any messages to us . . . this is their mentality and method. They don’t want to 
show that they are negotiating with us or reacting to our pressure. . . .”22 
There appears to be some form of ongoing interaction between Iran and 
al-Qaeda. Aside from those captives, other al-Qaeda operatives appear to have 
been allowed to come to Iran and live relatively freely. As recently as July 2016, 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned several operatives believed to 
be living in Iran for actively supporting terrorist operations across the region, 
including in Syria.23 What purpose al-Qaeda members living in Iran serve, 
Most of Iran’s relationships are not driven 
by ideological or religious considerations.
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what status they have, and how openly they are able to conduct business is 
unclear. Although Iran and al-Qaeda are at war in Syria and in Yemen, the two 
seem to have developed a mutually beneficial relationship, at least concerning 
the activities and presence of al-Qaeda members operating from Iran. As a 
2012 West Point report on the Abbottabad documents concludes, the Iranian–
al-Qaeda relationship is “fraught with difficulties.”24 Iran probably values its 
limited al-Qaeda presence as a form of leverage that could be used, at various 
times, against the United States, neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, 
or the states that the al-Qaeda suspects hail from.25 The U.S. Department of 
the Treasury believes that Iran has struck a bargain with the jihadist organiza-
tion, allowing it a small presence in return for no al-Qaeda–sponsored terror-
ism or recruitment within its borders.26 Iran might also see al-Qaeda members 
as potential hostages of its own should it need them. Whatever the case may 
be, it speaks to an uncomfortable political arrangement. 
Why does the Islamic Republic pursue relationships that are hard to square 
with its religious beliefs? Generally, it is because they correspond with the 
regime’s politics and antagonism toward the United States, or because they 
serve some other economic or strategic purpose. Most of Iran’s relationships are 
not driven by ideological or religious considerations. Rather, Iranian foreign 
policy, like that of most states, is based on a number of factors. When reli-
gion does come into play, it usually intersects with more paramount national 
security and strategic interests. In many ways, the Islamic Republic’s foreign 
policy has been fueled by its own realpolitik inclinations—inclinations that 
have enabled it to engage in arms deals with the United States and Israel during 
the Iran-Iraq war, maintain a limited relationship with al-Qaeda, and strike a 
strategic partnership with Russia.27 
The Problem With Exporting the Revolution
To understand the rationale behind Iran’s foreign policy, one should note that 
the 1979 revolution was above all a rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, 
especially the influence of the United States. Anti-Americanism and anti-
imperialism were themes that unified Iran’s diverse revolutionary movement. 
Revolutionaries used a popular slogan—neither East nor 
West—to assert their desire for Iran to strike a politi-
cally and ideologically independent path. The revolution 
included strands of Iranian nationalism and Islamism, 
which, echoing philosopher Frantz Fanon, framed Shia 
Islam as Iran’s true native political system. Khomeinists 
also had a strong pan-Islamic agenda.
After the revolution, Khomeinists emerged as the dominant faction. Their 
commitment to anti-Americanism was as firm as their desire to establish 
an Islamic form of government following Khomeini’s thesis of clerical rule 
The 1979 revolution was above all a 
rejection of foreign dominion over Iran.
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(velayat-e faqih). This system of theocratic government, which was adopted in 
the Islamic Republic’s 1979 constitution, placed near-total control in the hands 
of a single senior Shia cleric, the supreme leader (rahbar), who would oversee 
all branches of the state and have veto power over decision-
making. Iran’s two supreme leaders to date—Khomeini, 
who held the post from 1979 until his death in 1989, and 
Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini that year and has 
been in power ever since—have acted more as stewards 
of the decisionmaking process than as micromanagers. 
Under Khamenei, the supreme leader’s office has become 
more involved in the policy process than it had been under 
his predecessor, but even so, as long as official bodies remain within the param-
eters that the supreme leader sets, they are generally afforded space to pursue 
their agendas. 
Aside from the supreme leader, other governmental institutions were created 
after the revolution to take on the everyday tasks of building and enforcing 
policy. The democratically elected executive branch is formally responsible for 
Iran’s foreign policy, while the appointed Guardian Council—a board of Shia 
clerical and civilian jurists—vets candidates for office and ensures government 
policies comport with Shia law. Today, the Supreme National Security Council 
(SNSC) is Iran’s most important body for strategic decisionmaking and is com-
posed of top government officials, military chiefs, and representatives of the 
supreme leader. The SNSC is said to officially sign off on major foreign policy 
and strategic decisions—whether they are initially generated by the govern-
ment or the IRGC—before they are put into action.
What animated Iran’s decisionmaking calculus after the revolution was an 
all-encompassing trepidation that the United States or its allies would attempt 
to overthrow the fledgling revolutionary regime. Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 
September 1980, and the war that followed, was a manifestation of that fear. 
The support that Western states and Iran’s Arab neighbors provided Saddam 
Hussein during the war was proof to Iran that Washington and its allies would 
go to great lengths to defeat the revolution.28 Iran was surrounded by hostile 
states and alienated from much of the international community. Iran’s only 
friend in the region was Syria under Hafez al-Assad, who shared a mutual 
antagonism for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Tehran’s leadership did not see their alienation as an outcome of their own 
hostile behavior and rhetoric; rather, it was part of an imperialistic conspiracy 
aimed at rooting out the nascent Islamic Republic and destroying its theo-
cratic system. As Khomeini asserted in 1984, the war was not against Iran, but 
against the Islam that Iran promoted:
Iran’s leaders embraced a radical form of 
internationalism, viewing foreign policy 
as the management of antagonisms.
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The superpowers are intent on opposing Islam at present. The other puppet 
regimes would do likewise. . . . Is it Iran that threatens them or is it Islam? If 
they call on the Arabs to unite, it is a call to unity against Islam. They consider 
Islam to be against their interests. You . . . should note that all the powers have 
risen against Islam and not against Iran. . . . If they find the opportunity and 
if you do not pay attention Islam will be uprooted.29 
The war confirmed for Iran’s leaders that in order to truly safeguard their 
revolution, its ideology and politics must be spread outside Iran’s borders. The 
best defense, in their estimation, was a good offense. Iran’s leaders embraced 
a radical form of internationalism, [that rejected] the norms of liberal inter-
nationalism.30 Their approach included a policy of exporting the revolution, 
which meant taking the revolution’s politics and ideological values to other 
oppressed polities—especially in the developing world—and helping like-
minded liberation and Islamic movements achieve self-determination.31 
The IRGC was the prime mechanism for this policy. As the organization 
stated in 1980:
We have no recourse but to mobilize all of the faithful forces of the Islamic 
Revolution, and with the mobilization of forces in every region, we must strike 
fear into the hearts of our enemies so that the idea of invasion and the destruc-
tion of our Islamic Revolution will exit from their minds. If our revolution 
does not have an internationalistic and aggressive worldview the enemies of 
Islam will once again enslave us culturally and politically.32 
It was under the rubric of exporting the revolution that Iran pursued part-
nerships with a range of nonstate actors. Through the IRGC, Tehran funneled 
support to the mostly Sunni Palestinian movement—it also backed Christian 
Palestinian militants, such as George Habash and his secular Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine. A similar effort led to the organization of non-
Iranian Shia groups that, unlike the Palestinians, not only accepted Iranian 
support but also adopted Khomeinist ideology as their own. Hezbollah in 
Lebanon is the foremost example of the IRGC’s success in cultivating a closely 
knit allegiance with a foreign entity along shared political and religious lines. 
The other lasting successes are the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its Badr military 
wing, which were established by Iraqi Shia expatriates in 
Iran and trained by the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war.33 
The assertive behavior of supporting nonstate groups 
in the Middle East thus became a foundational element 
of Iran’s post-1979 foreign policy. Iran’s leaders consid-
ered this approach to be essential to the long-term success and security of 
the Islamic revolution. Although the scope of Iran’s foreign activities waned 
Supporting nonstate groups in the Middle 
East became a foundational element 
of Iran’s post-1979 foreign policy.
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throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s as the country focused on healing its 
war-torn economy, it continued to support allied groups outside its borders and 
looked for opportunities to expand its client base, as it did in Bosnia during the 
Balkan war of the 1990s.34 
Over time, these relationships became vital strategic investments that paid 
dividends for Iran. With them, Iran was able to develop an outsized role for 
itself and its clients in the Middle East’s most important conflicts and politi-
cal issues, including the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the broader Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the ongoing war in 
Syria. Alienated by its neighbors, Iran found value in making friends with 
nonstate groups.
The Limits of Pan-Islamism and 
Emergence of Nonstate Clients 
Although the Islamic Republic is a distinctly Shia enterprise, Khomeini dis-
couraged overt Shia sectarianism. Instead, he emphasized pan-Islamism and 
regularly made appeals to Sunnis on the basis of Islamic unity. Khomeini 
would charge that the enemies of Iran’s revolution—the United States, Israel, 
and imperialism—were the enemies of Islam writ large, and that they sought 
to weaken the global Muslim community by exacerbating interconfessional 
disputes. In a 1980 declaration, Khomeini asserted:
More saddening and dangerous than nationalism is the creation of dissension 
between Sunnis and Shi‘is and diffusion of mischievous propaganda among 
brother Muslims. . . . I extend the hand of brotherhood to all committed 
Muslims in the world and ask them to regard Shi‘is as cherished brothers and 
thereby frustrate the sinister plans of foreigners.35 
Beyond such calls for unity, Khomeini also wanted Iran’s version of Islamic 
government, which thrust clergy into positions of political authority and poli-
cymaking, to inspire other Islamic societies to adopt similar theocratic systems. 
He adopted pan-Islamic causes, and made the Palestinian issue paramount, to 
show that his movement and the interests of the Islamic Republic had com-
mon cause with the wider Muslim world. Khomeini and many of the most 
ardent proponents of exporting the revolution—such as Ayatollah Hossein-
Ali Montazeri (the once-assumed successor to Khomeini), his son Mohammad 
Montazeri, and Ali Akbar Mohtashami— considered support to the Palestinian 
movement to be Iran’s foremost foreign policy concern.36 Ayatollah Montazeri 
even charged the IRGC with leading support to the Palestinians, stating:
Liberation of beloved Jerusalem is an important issue to us. Consequently, in 
order to realise the slogan “Today Iran; tomorrow Palestine” and to strengthen 
the profound bond between the Islamic revolution of Iran and the Palestine 
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revolution, it would be appropriate for the [IRGC] to implement certain pro-
grammes both inside and outside the country in order to strengthen ideologi-
cal foundations as well as to promote and expand their religious knowledge of 
Palestinian Muslims.37 
Support to the Palestinians trumped any latent pro-Shia, sectarian inclina-
tions. A prime example early after the revolution was Iran’s staunch backing of 
former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s Fatah organization in its conflict with 
the Shia Amal Movement in southern Lebanon—an organization established 
by the Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr and his lieutenant, Mustafa Chamran, 
himself a prominent personality in Iran’s revolution.38 The Amal Movement 
was a communalist enterprise focused on the social and political uplifting of 
Lebanon’s long-marginalized Shia community. However, Amal quickly fell out 
of Khomeini’s favor because it was seen as asserting the interests of the south-
ern Lebanese Shia over those of exiled Palestinian militants in Lebanon—the 
latter had established bases in Shia areas through confiscation and coercion, 
thus provoking tension and conflict with Amal.39 Iran eventually broke ties 
with Arafat after the Palestinian leader supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-
Iraq war, but support for the broader Palestinian movement and for Palestinian 
militant groups remained a priority for Tehran. 
Ardent support for the Palestinians, however, did not translate into much 
support from Sunnis for Khomeini or his cause. Rather, the particular Shia 
flavor of Iran’s Islamic revolution and theocratic system, which was firmly 
rooted in the Shia clerical tradition, severely mitigated the attraction of the 
Khomeinist model for Sunni Islamist constituencies.40 Iran’s activists tried to 
make inroads with Sunni Muslim movements from Eritrea to the Philippines, 
but the Khomeinist message remained a tough sell.41 
Sunnis were not alone in their lack of receptivity. Senior Shia clergy out-
side of Iran widely criticized the cornerstone of Khomeini’s ideology—Islamic 
government ruled by the clergy—for being an errant departure from the tra-
ditional apolitical role of clergy in Shia societies.42 Khomeini’s ideas did not 
gain much purchase in clerical circles and were largely unattractive to lay Shia 
communities in South Asia and the Arab world.43 
However, Khomeini’s message did somewhat resonate with already-polit-
icized Shia activists in Iraq and Lebanon. Iranian revolutionaries (including 
both clerical leaders and early members of the IRGC) had established informal 
networks in Lebanon and among the Iraqi Shia before the revolution. They 
were able to utilize their preexisting connections with Arab Shia activists and, 
with state backing, transform those relationships into the formation of pro-
Iranian client organizations.44 
These efforts benefited from the social and political dislocation caused 
by regional conflicts. In the case of Hezbollah, the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon provided a turning point for Shia domestic politics. Israel’s occupation 
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of southern Lebanon accelerated a split within Amal, the more militant activ-
ists of which moved firmly into the pro-Palestinian camp and became more 
receptive to the ideology and politics of Khomeini.45 In Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s 
suppression of Shia political groups, which escalated violently after the Iranian 
revolution, further radicalized Iraqi Shia activists and led to a surge of Iraqi 
Shia exiles settling in Iran. Iran’s support to these constituencies produced 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iraqi expatriate organizations of the SCIRI 
and Badr in Iran. All of these groups embraced the broad framework of 
Khomeinist ideology.
Iran had less success elsewhere. In the 1980s, Iran tried to develop like-
minded clients among Afghanistan’s Shia and Sunni Tajik Islamists. The Soviet 
war in Afghanistan provided an opening for Iran’s support, and though that 
support helped develop some nominally pro-Tehran clients within the coun-
try, those groups never coalesced into a sustainable movement.46 Iran retained 
contacts with Hazara and Tajik militias and continued to provide them sup-
port during the 1990s and early 2000s, but that support did not translate into 
special affinity for Khomeinism or Iran’s political objectives more broadly.47 
Similarly, the IRGC’s intervention in the Balkan conflict of the early 1990s, 
where it funneled arms and support to Bosnian Muslim militias, was relatively 
short lived and unsuccessful at establishing a lasting pro-Iranian movement.48 
Ties to Hezbollah and Palestinian groups became a strategic asset for Iran 
after the war with Iraq. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, these 
relationships afforded Iran a credible deterrent against outward Israeli and U.S. 
aggression. By being able to threaten escalation by proxy, Iran could leverage 
its clients as tools in dealing with its two primary enemies. It is likely that this 
dynamic crystallized for Iran the value of developing and maintaining such 
client networks in strategically important locations.
More broadly, the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was a turning point in 
the Middle East. It provided an opportunity for Iraq’s long-oppressed Shia to 
return to politics, and it opened the doors to Iranian influence. Iran’s allies 
in the SCIRI, and the organization’s IRGC-trained and IRGC-aligned Badr 
military wing, soon returned home from exile and became part of Iraq’s new 
political reality. Internal Iraqi politics proved a complicating factor for Iran’s 
relationships. Seeking to distance itself from the perception of being an Iranian 
proxy, the SCIRI changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq 
(SICI), and its clerical leaders downplayed their previous commitment to 
Khomeinism.49 This encouraged a split with Badr, which, under the leadership 
of Hadi al-Amiri, formed a new political entity dubbed the Badr Organization, 
which remained close to the IRGC and Tehran.50 
The U.S. occupation of Iraq coincided with the administration of then 
U.S. president George W. Bush and its escalating rhetoric toward Iran. After 
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being dubbed part of an “axis of evil” in Bush’s 2002 State of the Union 
address, Iran’s leaders began to worry about a growing military threat from 
the United States.51 Iran’s secret nuclear program, revealed to the public in 
the fall of 2002, gave the Bush administration a casus belli for ratcheting up 
the pressure. The presence of hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. troops right across the border in Iraq, not to mention 
also in nearby Afghanistan, was threatening to Iran. In 
response, the IRGC began a covert effort to organize and 
train small Iraqi Shia militias and use them to target U.S. 
forces.52 Through its Shia clients, Iran possessed the ability 
to harass and target U.S. forces by proxy, and it could threaten to escalate that 
violence should the United States ever strike Iran. Unlike Iran’s more above-
board allies in Iraq, the militias were much more extreme in their politics, 
more in line with Iranian ideology, and more involved in sectarian violence, 
particularly during the 2006–2007 civil war.53 Iran pursued a similar strategy 
in Afghanistan, where it provided weapons to segments of the anti-U.S. insur-
gency. However, those links have not lead to the creation of a client base as 
strong and committed to Iran’s agenda as that found in Iraq.54 
As the Iraqi militias grew in size and influence, they became a way for Iran 
to influence Iraqi politics from below. Combined with Iran’s long-lasting con-
tacts with Badr and the SICI, as well with more recently groomed ties to other 
prominent Shia politicians, Iranian influence was able to permeate Iraqi politi-
cal dynamics. Beyond giving Iran tremendous influence there, those relation-
ships, particularly the IRGC’s close proximity to extremist Shia militias, also 
presented Iran as a decidedly sectarian actor in Iraq. 
Sectarianism and the Arab Spring
Like his predecessor, Ali Khamenei has been an advocate of Muslim unity. 
To Khamenei, divisions in the Muslim world are not natural, but rather the 
product of U.S. propaganda and the policies of U.S. allies. He even disputes 
the Shia character of the Islamic Republic, asserting, for example: 
Ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the arrogant powers 
have been trying to portray our revolution as a Shi‘i revolution . . . [but] if our 
revolution had been a Shi‘i revolution, we would have become separated from 
the Islamic world and had nothing to do with it. They would have had nothing 
to do with us either. They would have expressed no hostility to our revolution. 
But they have noticed that our revolution is an Islamic revolution.55 
Such claims speak to the reputation Khamenei would like for Iran to have. 
But these claims are undermined by Iran’s actual behavior in the Middle East, 
especially since the Arab Spring.
Claims [of pan-Islamic unity] are undermined 
by Iran’s actual behavior in the Middle East.
16 | Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide
Iran initially hailed the popular protests that spread across the Arab world in 
late 2010 and early 2011. That enthusiasm was ironic, given how Iran had suf-
fered through its own explosion of mass unrest following the contested 2009 
reelection of then president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Despite condemnation 
from the West, Iranian security forces viciously put down these demonstra-
tions, ignoring the legitimate grievances of ordinary Iranians and dismiss-
ing the episode as a foreign plot to overthrow the regime. But when protests 
erupted across Bahrain and Egypt, Iran’s leaders cheered the outpouring of 
discontent as righteous and legitimate. Iranian officials were particularly vocal 
regarding Bahrain, where they called on the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family to 
respect popular democracy and the will of the country’s people. As the Iranian 
supreme leader’s top foreign policy adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, saw it, the prob-
lem was simple: 
The people of Bahrain have said that they are not at war with anyone. They 
call for [negotiations] between themselves and the regime. They are calling 
for a one-man-one-vote system . . . It should not be that the Shi‘i would be 
regarded as a second-class citizen in Bahrain. Between 60 to 70 percent of the 
people there are Shi‘i. They, proportionate to that 60 to 70 percent, have to 
have the vote.56 
For Velayati, the issue in Bahrain was not one of religious identity but one of 
fairness. Shia or not, the people of Bahrain deserved to have their voices heard. 
And just because Iran also happened to be majority Shia did not mean that its 
support for co-religionists in Bahrain was driven by sectarian interests. Rather, 
Velayati cited his country’s broad support for all Muslims to rebuff accusations 
of bias: 
Have we not, us the Islamic Republic, supported Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
who are both Sunnis? Have we not supported Bosnians who are Sunni broth-
ers? . . . These kinds of conspiracies, where they would say that as the Bahrainis 
are Shi‘i they are acting under the influence of Iranians against a Sunni gov-
ernment; this has lost its meaning these days.57 
The notion that Iran cannot be sectarian because it has Sunni friends is 
one of the more common arguments Iranian authorities such as Velayati make 
when disputing perceived sectarian inclinations. This has not been effective at 
allaying the concerns of Iran’s neighbors.
As Middle East experts Toby Mathiessen and Frederic Wehrey have shown, 
the February 2011 protests in Bahrain were not spurred by sectarianism and 
certainly were not engineered by Iran. It was a populist, grassroots movement 
by a marginalized, yet demographic-majority community, seeking greater 
inclusion and political reform.58 A Shia uprising, however, regardless of the rea-
son, triggered the deeply ingrained fears of Gulf Arab leaders, who have long 
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worried that Iran could use Shia populations to destabilize their monarchies. 
They saw Iran’s hand in the unrest and collectively moved to crush it.
Iran did Bahrain’s protest movement no favors by standing out as its main 
champion, particularly after the movement was violently put down by a Saudi-
led GCC military operation. Bahraini authorities already had linked some 
local Shia activists to the IRGC, which made the latter an easy scapegoat used 
to undermine the legitimacy of the protests. When IRGC-
affiliated commentators began threatening reprisals in 
response to the intervention, they helped make the tenu-
ous links between Iran and the protest movement appear 
more substantial. An editorial in the IRGC-linked Javan 
newspaper wrote:
Saudi and UAE troops should know that with the first bloodshed or massacre 
of the people of Bahrain, they will expect a harsh response that will not only 
render the Bahraini king and the ceremonial Saudi and UAE troops insecure, 
but also the US military base of 5,000 people will not remain safe and will 
bear a heavy blow with mutual responsibility. Eye for an eye and tooth for a 
tooth is the Koranic logic that is awaiting them. These countries must also 
accept the spread of the revolutionary movements in their own countries.59 
The author further concluded that while Washington and its allies were 
losing out in the Arab Spring, Iran was making “progress with regard to its 
objectives.”60 He confidently asserted: “The changes in the Middle East region 
are in line with Iran’s objectives.” Such statements made it evident that, from 
the IRGC’s perspective, the Shia uprising in Bahrain served Iran’s agenda.
Iran’s eager endorsement of the Arab Spring stumbled when it hit Syria. 
There is no shortage of hypocrisy in international politics, especially not in the 
Middle East, and Iran is no exception. As Iran hailed the will of the people 
in Bahrain, it condemned the foreign plot that was causing disorder in Syria. 
Unlike the demonstrations in Egypt and Bahrain, which threatened unfriendly 
governments, the protests in Syria put Iran’s foremost ally at risk. Syria under 
Bashar al-Assad has been Iran’s only state ally in the region, and more cru-
cially, a central node in its strategy against Israel and the United States. Assad 
has been the linchpin of Iran’s support to Hezbollah and a core member of 
Iran’s axis of resistance. When the protests spread beyond the Syrian govern-
ment’s control, the IRGC stepped in to help Assad crush the mounting rebel-
lion. IRGC Quds Force chief, Qassem Suleimani, explained Iran’s motivation: 
“[America’s] main goal is to break the resistance front.” He added, “We will 
support Syria till the end.”61 
Iran’s enemies and rivals have backed Syria’s largely Sunni rebels. This 
has raised the stakes for Tehran. Iran has concluded that if Assad were to be 
defeated, his replacement would be the client of the United States or Gulf Arab 
Iran’s eager endorsement of the Arab 
Spring stumbled when it hit Syria.
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By equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran 
further muddies the water of identity politics.
rivals, and therefore inimical to Iranian interests. For Iran, backing Assad has 
not been simply a means of preserving strategic interests. It has been a neces-
sity to prevent a virulently anti-Shia movement, patronized by Iran’s enemies, 
from taking root in the region. As one editorial in the conservative Siyasat-e 
Ruz newspaper later put it:
It is one of the unattainable dreams of the USA and its ally Al Sa‘ud that 
Iran would become like Syria. They were dreaming that after the [Bashar al-
Assad] collapses, it would be Iran’s turn to be raided by takfiri, Salafi, and 
Al-Qa’idah groups just as they are doing in Syria. In fact, Al Sa‘ud has begun 
a war with Iran, whose soldiers are not the army of Saudi Arabia, but rather 
the radical Wahhabi and takfiri terrorists who are at enmity with and hostile 
towards Shia Islam. The news and reports of the anti-Iranian and anti-Shi‘i 
stances by some clerics in this group against Iran is spread to intensify the 
anti-Iranian atmosphere.62 
To defend its role in the Syrian war, Iran regularly has 
claimed to be fighting a foreign conspiracy aimed at top-
pling the legitimate government in Damascus. But the 
sectarian dimensions of the conflict have been impossible 
to conceal. Iran’s allies in Syria are the loyalists of Bashar 
al-Assad. Although these loyalists include Sunnis and 
Christians, Alawites—the same Shia minority community that the Assad clan 
hails from—have held most positions of power in the regime. As the war has 
progressed, Iran has facilitated the entry of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia 
militias, and eventually Shia Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries to help the 
loyalist effort. This has made Iran’s side of the conflict distinctly Shia and sec-
tarian, much as the Sunni rebellion has also become.
Iranian and IRGC officials have done their best to deflect the issue by reject-
ing any sectarian agenda out of hand, and by emphasizing that their war is 
not with Sunnis, but rather with terrorists and takfiris—a term widely used to 
describe the ideology of jihadist groups, such as the Nusra Front and the self-
proclaimed Islamic State, which view fellow Muslims who do not share their 
literalist beliefs to be apostates and therefore not protected under Islamic law. 
However, for Iranian officials, the takfirism of the Islamic State is synonymous 
with the Wahhabi strain of Sunnism that Saudi Arabia promotes. For example, 
Ali Akbar Velayati has referred to Saudi Arabia as the “origin” of takfirism, 
adding: “Wahhabism is an extremist and incorrect interpretation of Islam and 
its exports are Daesh, al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda. . . . Therefore the presence of 
Saudis in [Syria] is closely related to Takfiri terrorist groups.”63 
Similarly, commenting on the Islamic State and other jihadists in Syria and 
Iraq, the Iranian speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, has claimed that such 
groups have “no relationship” with Islam and that Sunnism “rejects and denies 
the principles and thinking” of the Islamic State and its ilk. Rather, he contin-
ued, “it is only the Wahhabis” who ascribe to such beliefs.64 Ayatollah Sadegh 
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Since the Arab Spring, Iran’s regional behavior 
has shifted toward a more outward sectarianism.
Larijani, the brother of the parliamentary speaker and himself the head of 
Iran’s judiciary, has proclaimed that “takfiri and Salafi currents are not related 
to Islam” or Sunnism, but are ideological sects created by the West “to weaken 
Islamic societies” from within.65 
Iran’s antipathy for Wahhabi and Salafi jihadism is unsurprising. Both teach 
that Shiism is a dangerous and deviant sect, the believers of which are beyond 
the fold of Islam.66 As Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, Grand Mufti Abd al-Aziz Al 
al-Sheikh, told a Saudi journalist in September 2016: “You must understand, 
they [the Iranian regime] are not Muslims. They are sons of the Majous [that is, 
Zoroastrians]. Their hostility to Muslims is ancient, specifically with Sunnis.”67 
The rhetoric of Iranian officials is rooted in that shared antipathy. 
However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the 
water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq 
and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an 
extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, 
therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rheto-
ric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating 
who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral 
observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a for-
eign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran’s Sunni neighbors. 
Toward a Transnational Shia Movement
Through its nearly four-decade history, the Islamic Republic has acted in 
chiefly nonsectarian ways when it comes to its broader foreign and regional 
policies. There are examples in which shared sectarian backgrounds have facili-
tated Iran’s relationships with nonstate clients, primarily 
with Hezbollah and Iraqi groups, but when viewed against 
the totality of its foreign policy actions, those relationships 
are not enough to suggest that Iranian foreign policy has 
been primarily driven by a pro-Shia impulse. 
However, since the Arab Spring, Iran’s regional behav-
ior has shifted toward a more outward sectarianism. Sectarianism has become 
a way for Iran and its Sunni rivals to defend their interests and equities in the 
region’s conflicts. Like its enemies, the IRGC seems to have embraced that 
logic, and now sees its side, and the regional political battlefield as a whole, 
through a sectarian lens. The statements of IRGC officials, combined with the 
organization’s behavior, attest to that shift and suggest that its agenda in the 
Middle East has become dominated by confessional concerns. 
IRGC Major General Qassem Suleimani has asserted that Iran’s place in 
the Muslim world is second to none, saying: “Although a number of Islamic 
countries claim to lead the Islamic world today . . . none are able to fulfill this 
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perilous responsibility other than Iran.”68 What enabled Iran to rise to such 
heights, when so many other Muslim countries had failed to do so? Its dedi-
cation to foreign involvement, Suleimani argues. As he puts it, “Supporting 
Islamic and revolutionary warriors and defending Muslims and Islam from 
[enemy] assaults” have allowed Iran to “take leadership of the Islamic world.”69 
Suleimani sees Iran’s power as emanating from two fundamental sources: 
“The greatness of the Islamic revolution” and the revolution’s impact on the 
“cherished Shiite faith.” He points to Iraq as an example where “Shiites now 
have seized the right to govern” to illustrate the impact of Iran’s influence. At 
no other point in history have the “struggles of the Shia or that of the Shia 
clergy” produced the same “global effects” as the Islamic revolution, according 
to Suleimani.70 
These statements encapsulate the themes of Iranian exceptionalism that 
most irk Iran’s neighbors. Suleimani is simultaneously claiming that Iran has 
leadership of the Muslim world while also linking Iranian influence to its for-
eign activities and Shiism. As much as Iranian officials often downplay the 
confessional angle of Iran’s extraterritorial activism, Suleimani celebrates it, 
offering the achievements of the Shia in Iraq as a prime example of the revolu-
tion’s political impact. 
While Suleimani holds up Iran as the leader of the entire Muslim world, his 
meaning is much narrower. For Suleimani and Iranian authorities in general, 
the Muslim world is divided between those who support Islam and those who 
support Islam’s enemies. Iran’s clients and allies are part of the former, the so-
called axis of resistance, and most of Iran’s Western-friendly Sunni neighbors 
are part of the latter. Conflicts in the Middle East are divided along these 
lines and driven by Islam’s enemies and their surrogates. The Islamic State and 
other jihadist groups are seen in that context as tools the West has created and 
used to destroy Islam from within. As IRGC Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi 
explains, the “Saudis, Americans, and Zionists” are using the Islamic State 
to “destroy the real Islam—the front led by the Shia.”71 In describing Iran’s 
role in Syria, another IRGC commander, Ismail Heydari, has claimed that the 
war is not a civil conflict, but rather a battle of “Islam against the infidels. A 
war of good versus evil.” On the side of good are Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi 
and Afghan mujahideen—all Shia actors. On the side of evil are Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, America, France, and “other Europeans.”72 
Similarly, when discussing the plight of the Palestinians, the secretary of 
Iran’s SNSC, Ali Shamkhani, has stated that while “Sunni states are staying 
silent regarding the inhumane crimes of the Zionist entity, the greatest amount 
of support to the oppressed Palestinian people has come from Shia Iran.”73 
Shamkhani’s point is that while some states only condemn Israeli policy vis-à-
vis the Palestinians with words, Iran does so with actions. It talks the talk and 
walks the walk. But what is more interesting is Shamkhani’s sectarian framing. 
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Outward signs of confessional identity 
permeate Iran’s network in Syria and give 
it an unequivocal sectarian guise.
The fact that Shia Iran is helping Sunni Palestinians is meant to shame Sunni 
states. This also reaffirms Iran’s Shia identity. 
Instead of subverting sectarian associations, Iranian officials through these 
statements feed into sectarian narratives with their own rhetoric. These state-
ments also speak to a certain intellectual honesty, in that even Iran’s officials 
know that their political movement—however they describe it—is largely Shia 
and runs counter to the interests or policies of most Sunni states. The sectarian 
dimensions of the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts are evident. Iran’s closest allies in 
these contexts are Shia or perceived as such. Although Iran’s leadership tries to 
obscure that inconvenient truth through various rhetorical lines, the religious 
symbols and language used to describe the involvement of Iran and its allies 
betray any nuance. 
For example, IRGC leaders routinely assert that the war in Syria is nonsec-
tarian, but rather a war between a legitimate government and foreign-backed 
terrorists. Mazaher Majdi, the deputy commander of the IRGC’s Ansar al-
Husayn Brigade, once even described the loyalist forces in Syria as “130,000 
Sunnis defending their country [who] need our help.”74 But like the IRGC 
itself, its entire project in Syria is steeped in Shia confessional language and 
symbolism. Take the name of Majdi’s own command, the Ansar al-Husayn 
Brigade, which translates to “Helpers of Husayn” and is a reference to Imam 
Husayn—the third Shia imam and its most revered martyr and hero. Such 
names are how the IRGC marks its religious identity.75 
Those same outward signs of confessional identity permeate Iran’s network 
in Syria and give it an unequivocal sectarian guise. To help overstretched forces 
in Syria, the IRGC developed a unit known as the Fatimaiyun Brigade com-
posed of between 3,000 and 13,000 (estimates vary) Afghan immigrants from 
Iran—primarily Shia Hazaras with some Sunni Tajiks.76 
Afghan immigrants are something of an underclass in 
Iran; they are often poor, with limited educational and 
employment opportunities. Most have impermanent sta-
tus, and legal residency is difficult to attain. The methods 
used to recruit Afghans for war play to those motivations, 
as recruits are offered monthly stipends, work permits, or 
residency papers.77 Some seem to have been recruited from 
jails and given pardons in exchange for military service.78 Smaller numbers 
come from outside Iran, including from Afghan communities in Syria and 
from Afghanistan proper.79 A similar unit, known as the Zaynabiyun Brigade, 
is composed of several hundred to a few thousand (again, estimates vary) Shia 
of Pakistani origin. Most come from the Pakistani Shia expatriate community 
in Iran, particularly those associated with al-Mustafa International University 
in the city of Qom.80 
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Neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani units are billed as mercenary forces, 
or even as a foreign legion. Rather, they are defined in religious terms. Retired 
IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Falaki, who served in Syria, has 
emphasized that point: “They fight in Syria due to their commitment to Islam, 
not because of ethnicity . . . but [out] of their commitment to Shiism.”81 This 
idea is conveyed by the two groups’ names, which both honor revered members 
of the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Fatimaiyun (which could be rendered 
as Devotees of Fatima or Partisans of Fatima) is an homage to Fatima, the 
Prophet’s daughter and the wife of the first Shia imam, Ali. It is through Ali 
and Fatima that the remaining eleven Shia imams are descended, making her 
the matriarch of Shiism. She is revered for her saintly qualities, and she holds 
an unparalleled station within the pantheon of Shiism similar to that of Mary 
in Catholicism. The name Zaynabiyun (or Devotees of Zaynab) similarly hon-
ors the daughter of Fatima, who accompanied her brother, Imam Husayn, 
during his last stand and martyrdom at Karbala in 680 CE. Her heroic actions 
in that founding episode of the Shia religion earned her a revered place in its 
spiritual tradition. She died as a prisoner in Damascus, where a famous mosque 
dedicated to her memory became a Shia pilgrimage site and the center of a 
largely Shia neighborhood. 
Some might view such religiosity as superficial. Even if that were the case, 
the chosen symbolism would still be important. It is not only intentionally 
and self-consciously employed by the groups’ overseers in the IRGC but also 
an unsubtle display of sectarianism not lost on Sunnis.82 Both of these bri-
gades are meant to represent Shia armies composed of pious Shia warriors. 
Commenting on the devoutness of his troops, the Fatimaiyun commander, 
known by the nom de guerre Karbala, has said: “The takfiris have no faith and 
so many fear death. But we do not fear martyrdom.”83 The commander’s nom 
de guerre is significant, too. By adopting the name Karbala, the commander 
evokes the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and draws a linkage between his fight-
ers and their spiritual ancestors.84 Any hint of secularism is missing. If these 
groups’ goal is nonsectarian, it is completely concealed by the religious cloak-
ing of their organizations. 
The religious manner in which the IRGC refers to the participants in its 
Syrian operations and their mission is revealing. Perhaps the best glimpse the 
public has had into Iran’s ground operations in Syria comes through film footage 
taken from the camera of an IRGC filmmaker who was killed in an ambush by 
a Syrian rebel group in late August 2013. That rebel group released the footage 
to provide evidence of Iran’s role in the conflict, and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation later transformed the footage into a short documentary.85 
The video centers on an IRGC unit that oversees a contingent of Syrian 
militia called the Sayyida Ruqayya Brigade near the city of Aleppo. Sayyida 
Ruqayya is the title Shia use for the daughter of Imam Husayn. She died in 
prison as a child a few years after her father’s martyrdom. She was buried in 
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Damascus, where a mosque was later built in her honor. Like that of her aunt 
Zaynab, her name is used as a marker of both Syrian and Shia identity. It evokes 
the injustice of her father’s martyrdom, the cruel imprisonment of his family, 
and the historical oppression that the Shia endured under Sunni dominion 
after the Karbala massacre. By adopting her name as their own, the IRGC and 
its Syrian allies in the film footage represent the protectors of Sayyida Ruqqaya 
both literally and figuratively. They are defending the territory that holds her 
tomb and are fighting to preserve the legacy of the Prophet’s family in Syria. 
The way Iran describes its war in Syria, particularly in memorializing its sol-
diers killed there, draws on analogous religious connotations. Soldiers killed in 
Syria are hailed as martyrs, and they are buried with both the honors of patri-
otic soldiers and with the reverence of fallen religious heroes.86 Iranian officials 
describe them as having died “defending the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab”—an 
honorific used for the sister of Imam Husayn. The Sayyida Zaynab Mosque in 
Damascus, which according to Shia belief houses her tomb, became the cen-
tral metaphor for Iranian involvement and sacrifice in Syria. The image of the 
mosque’s golden dome adorns Iran’s memorials of the hundreds of its Iranian, 
Afghan, and Pakistani soldiers killed in action.87 
Iran describes its role in the war against the Islamic State in Iraq in similar 
terms. Iraq is home to the most sacred Shia shrines, including that of Imam 
Husayn in Karbala and that of Imam Ali in the city of Najaf. The historical 
legacy of Shiism in Iraq has made it sanctified ground for the Shia. When 
Iranian soldiers began getting killed in Iraq shortly after Iran’s intervention 
to back up the government of then prime minister Nouri al-Maliki in June 
2014, they were described as having died “in defense of the holy shrines.”88 
Again, this statement had literal and figurative connotations. While Iran has 
defended the government in Baghdad, it also has seen itself as defending the 
sacred ground of the imams from the anti-Shia scourge of Islamic State. This 
view has been shared across Iran’s leadership, with even the generally more 
circumspect President Hassan Rouhani vowing that Iran would not “spare any 
effort” to protect sacred Shia sites in Iraq.89 As with Iran’s Syrian martyrs, the 
placards and memorials of soldiers killed in Iraq often bore the imagery of that 
country’s Shia shrines.90 
In Iraq, in Syria, and in Yemen, Iran’s closest allies are Shia. Lebanese 
Hezbollah, various Iraqi Shia militias, Afghan and Pakistani foreign legions, 
the largely Alawite Popular Mobilization Forces in Syria, and the Zaidi Shia 
Ansar Allah organization in Yemen comprise a vast network of Iranian cli-
ents that all share a confessional identity. That these partnerships are based 
on shared sectarian affiliations is difficult to dispute, even for Iranian authori-
ties, who generally emphasize the nonsectarian nature of these relationships. 
What is more is that these partnerships appear, especially to Iran’s enemies 
and Sunni rivals, to be transforming into a transnational movement of Shia 
militancy under the command of Iran.91 This is not a misperception, but rather 
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something the IRGC, too, feels it has achieved. As retired IRGC Brigadier 
General Falaki explains:
A Shia Liberation Army has been formed. It is now under the command of 
Hajj Qassem Suleimani and obedient to the authority of the leader of the 
revolution [that is, Iran’s supreme leader]. This army comprises a single front 
in Syria, a single front in Iraq, and a single front in Yemen. The manpower for 
this army cannot come [solely] from Iran’s military forces. In whatever region 
it is deemed that this army is needed, the people of that region should be orga-
nized and provided the necessary support.92 
Falaki describes the Shia Liberation Army as being in lockstep with Iran’s 
leadership. Its members collectively operate “under the command of their 
Revolutionary Guard brothers” and share Iran’s goals. Together, “with one uni-
form, under one flag, as one organization, and as one front they fight jihad.”93 
Even though the vast collective is said to include Sunnis, Shiism is the animat-
ing force of its identity. 
Falaki’s comments caused a minor stir in the Arab and Western press. The 
explicit sectarianism of the Shia Liberation Army did not escape notice. Perhaps 
in an effort at damage control, the original Iranian website that published the 
interview, Mashregh, removed the word Shia from Falaki’s quotations. Even as 
outward signs of sectarianism have increased, this deletion reaffirms that the 
sensitivity toward appearing sectarian has not declined in Iranian officialdom. 
The IRGC’s effort at establishing a transnational Shia movement composed 
of militant groups and activists from across the greater Middle East and South 
Asia has benefited from the hardening of confessional identities since the Arab 
Spring. Violent suppression of Shia protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, com-
bined with the wars in Syria, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the 
Saudi-led intervention against the Houthis in Yemen have all contributed to a 
collective sharpening of identity among the region’s Shia. Toby Matthiesen has 
recognized this phenomena unfolding in what he calls “the Shia public sphere,” 
where the symbols used to sacralize the conflicts in Iraq and Syria have widely 
“spread through social media and Shia satellite channels . . . strengthening 
transnational sectarian identities.”94 
The wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are not simply strategic for the indig-
enous Shia (or Alawis and Zaidis). They are fights for survival. Defeat in these 
conflicts does not mean losing leverage against enemies, as is the case for Iran: 
instead, it means potentially losing villages, cities, or entire confessional com-
munities to the bloodlust of implacable foes, or at least succumbing to their 
brutal dominion. It is unsurprising that the region’s Shia would therefore sym-
pathize with Iran and its allies, if not support them. Iran and the IRGC have 
been able to harness that support because the Shia have no other power willing 
to side with them. Time will tell what becomes of the IRGC’s network, but 
the signs of a burgeoning transnational movement are there. The Shia militant 
groups loyal to Iran already see themselves as a global association under the 
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Iran might not see itself as a sectarian actor. But 
circumstances and an aggressive regional policy 
have progressively moved it in that direction.
spiritual and political authority of Iran’s supreme leader.95 That vision has been 
forged by a shared unity of purpose in the region’s conflicts. The longer these 
conflicts endure, and the more severely contested identity politics become, the 
stronger the bonds between Iran and its clients will grow.
Conclusion
As central as Shiism has been to Iranian domestic policies, how it has impacted 
foreign policies has been less clear cut. Religious identity and beliefs certainly 
influence Iran’s approach to foreign affairs, but they do not 
dictate them. Religion is one of many factors that fuel Iran’s 
behavior, and often is not the primary or even secondary 
consideration. The Shia character of the Islamic Republic 
might make Iran’s leaders more predisposed to support-
ing Shia outside of Iran than not. Yet, those inclinations 
are generally curbed by the regime’s self-interest. It would 
therefore be inaccurate to label Iran’s approach to foreign policy as sectarian 
(meaning primarily driven by Shia-centric beliefs and goals). Sectarianism is a 
latent and inescapable facet of Iranian foreign policy, but confessional aspira-
tions are not what drive the bulk of Iran’s decisions.
Iran might not see itself as a sectarian actor. But circumstances and an 
aggressive regional policy have progressively moved it in that direction. The 
revolution and the war with Iraq made Iran deeply unpopular with its neigh-
bors. Alienated, and unwilling to temper its politics, Iran became increasingly 
dependent on its nonstate clients to gain influence in the Middle East and 
leverage over its rivals. Despite the country’s links to some Sunni groups, Iran’s 
most important relationships have been forged with fellow Shia. These rela-
tionships have given Iranian foreign policy an undeniable sectarian guise. They 
have also provoked the indignation of Iran’s neighbors and stiffened their own 
sectarian inclinations.
Since the Arab Spring, as conflict and political unrest have exacerbated 
communal divisions across the Middle East, Iran’s policies, and the actions 
of the IRGC in particular, have fed the flames of difference more often than 
not. Iran is not alone in this regard. Saudi Arabia’s decades-long sponsorship 
of its intolerant brand of Sunnism, both in the Middle East and globally, is an 
undeniable factor. The support Arab states give to Sunni Islamist organizations 
across the region—not to mention these countries’ sectarian policies toward 
their own Shia populations and more broadly—has also worsened confessional 
divisions. The rise of Islamist and jihadist organizations—including Ahrar al-
Sham, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State—has shaped the current conflicts in 
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen as much as Iran’s clients have. 
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Who is to blame for the Middle East’s current sectarian woes? Arguments 
can be made for various culprits. Arab states blame Iran. Iran blames the United 
States, Israel, and Arab neighbors, above all Saudi Arabia. Everyone blames 
America. But such narratives are simplistic, lack self-criticism, and selectively 
ignore the exogenous and the endogenous sources of identity politics. It has 
been a collective effort, and Iran has played its part. While Iran’s foreign policy 
writ large exists mostly beyond the confines of confessionalism, this much is 
clear: as Iran’s neighborhood has become more sectarian, so has its behavior.
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